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Karl Barth on Religious and Irreligious Idolatry 
David Clough 
As far as Germany is concerned, the criticism of religion has been essentially 
completed, and the criticism of religion is the presupposition of all criticism  
…  The foundation of irreligious criticism is this: man makes religion, religion 
does not make man.  
(Karl Marx, 1844
1
) 
 
Christianity reproached heathenism for idolatry, Protestantism reproached 
Catholicism, or early Christianity, for idolatry, and Rationalism now 
reproaches Protestantism, at least the older orthodox Protestantism, for 
idolatry, because it worships a man as God, and therefore an image of God—
for that is what man is—in place of the original, in place of real being. But I 
go further and say: Rationalism itself, indeed every religion and every cult 
which sets up a God, i. e. an unreal being, a being different and separate from 
real nature … and which makes it an object of worship, is the worship of 
images and consequently idolatry. 
(Ludwig Feuerbach, 1848
2
) 
 
How are we to do theology after Feuerbach and Marx? For Karl Barth, the answer is 
simple. The proper response to these critiques of religion is to show that while all this 
is true, the theological critique of religion must be much more severe, with far wider 
consequences. The recognition of the scope and breadth of the idolatry of religion is a 
crucial ground-clearing exercise for a theology that seeks to be faithful to its subject, 
                                                
1
 Karl Marx, ‘Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction’ in  
Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977), 63. 
2
 Feuerbach, Das Wesen der Religion, lecture 20, cited in Karl Barth, Church 
Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. T. H. L. Parker et al., vol. 
II/1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), 292. 
 2
an exercise that also makes clear both the paths that are open to theological enquiry 
and the paths that are forbidden. For Barth, then, idolatry is not a subspecies of  
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sin falling under the first commandment, nor is it worship in an undue mode, as 
characterized by Aquinas.
3
 Rather, it is the universal and characteristic mode of 
human action seeking to evade the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 
 
1. The idolatry of religion 
Barth identifies a religious impulse in human beings: 
There seems always and everywhere to be an awareness of the reality and 
possibility of a dedication, or even a sanctification of the life of man, on the 
basis of an individual or social striving, which is almost always and 
everywhere referred to an event which comes from beyond. As a result, the 
representation of the object and aim of the striving, or the origin of the event, 
has always and everywhere been compressed into pictures of deities, with 
almost always and everywhere the picture of a supreme and only deity more 
or less clearly visible in the background.
4
 
Human beings need truth above and certainty within themselves, both of which they 
think they can know, Barth claims. ‘Since the need is there, have not the starry heaven 
above and the moral law within long since brought this truth and certainty into the 
range and realm of [man’s] perception?’ The path to idolatry is then a short one: ‘To 
                                                
3
 ‘For the divine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given, namely, 
to the true God, but “in an undue mode”, and this is the first species of superstition; or 
to whom it ought not to be given, namely, to any creature whatsoever, and this is 
another genus of superstition  …  For the end of divine worship is in the first place to 
give reverence to God, and in this respect the first species of this genus is “idolatry”, 
which unduly gives divine honour to a creature.’ (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. 
Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1947), 2–2, 
92.2). 
4
 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. G. T. 
Thomson and Harold Knight, vol. I/2 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), 282. 
 3
satisfy this need, he steps out in a bold bid for truth, creating the Deity according to 
his own image—and in a confident act of self-assurance, undertaking to justify and 
sanctify himself in conformity with what he holds to be the law.’
5
 Thus far we might 
find a broad consensus on the religious development of humankind between 
Durkheim, Feuerbach, and Christian theologians of many stripes. Yet at this point 
Barth makes a decisive break with virtually all his predecessors and contemporaries, a 
break that is fundamental to his theological method. Feuerbach saw a progressive 
development in religion from lower forms to higher: pantheism gives way to 
polytheism, polytheism to monotheism, and monotheism becomes ever more 
rationalistic, before necessarily giving way  
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to atheism.
6
 Apart from the last step, many Christian theologians have seen merit in 
this account: it seems historically reasonable, and affects a certain charitable tolerance 
towards earlier beliefs, while making clear the superiority of the Christian religion—
at least, so long as later religious movements are ignored or otherwise discounted. 
Emil Brunner, at one point a good friend of Barth’s, is one example of a theologian 
who takes this progressivist line. Brunner makes the reasonable claim that human 
beings can know to some extent through creation without the work of Christ and the 
Holy Spirit. This natural knowledge is partial, dim and darkened by sin, resulting in a 
misrepresentation of God, and the worship of idols. Brunner affirms that it stands in 
need of revelation to correct it and point more clearly to the true God. 
                                                
5
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 315. 
6
 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity: Milestones of Thought in the 
History of Ideas (New York: Continuum, 1990). 
 4
‘Nein!’ is the one-word title of the tract Barth wrote in response to Brunner’s 
work, which ended their friendship.
7
 Barth considered that the approach to natural 
theology Brunner had adopted threatened to lose all the ground they had established 
together against the prevailing trends of liberal German theology. The polemical tone 
of the work includes many rhetorical questions, one of which addresses the issue of 
idolatry directly: ‘Is it his opinion that idolatry is but a somewhat imperfect 
preparatory stage of the service of the true God?’
8
 Barth’s negative answer to this 
question rests on his belief that the revelation of God in Christ means the abolition 
and re-establishment (Aufhebung) of religion, rather than the redirection Brunner 
seems to envisage.
9
 The intensity with which Barth sees this arises from his 
engagement with Romans 1:18-32, the key New Testament text on idolatry. He calls 
this section of the 1922 edition of his explosive commentary, ‘The Night’, and on 
verse 23 comments: 
They changed the glory of the incorruptible—for an image of the corruptible 
… They had lost their knowledge of the crevasse, the polar zone, the desert 
barrier, which much be crossed if men are really to advance from corruption 
to incorruption … Once the eye, which can perceive this distinction, has 
been blinded, there arises in the midst,  
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7
 For an English translation both of Brunner’s essay ‘Nature and Grace’ and Barth’s 
response, see Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, Natural Theology, trans. Peter Fraenkel 
(London: The Centenary Press, 1946). Barth’s essay is also available in Clifford J. 
Green, ed., Karl Barth: Theologian of Freedom (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 
1991). 
8
 Barth, ‘Nein!’ in Green, Karl Barth, 158. 
9
 Aufhebung is a difficult word to translate. Garrett Green comments ‘Barth has 
borrowed a favourite term of Hegel’s and put it to his own use. He shares with Hegel 
the conviction that the truth can only be told by saying both no and yes; and he finds 
in the unique ambiguity of the verb aufheben a way of articulating their dialectical 
interrelationship’ (Garrett Green, ‘Challenging the Religous Studies Canon: Karl 
Barth's Theory of Religion’, Journal of Religion vol. 75, no. 4 (1995), 473–486, 477). 
 5
between here and there, between us and the ‘Wholly Other’, a mist or 
concoction of religion in which, by a whole series of skilful assimilations and 
mixings more or less strongly flavoured with sexuality, sometimes the 
behaviour of men or of animals is exalted to be an experience of God, 
sometimes the Being and Existence of God is ‘enjoyed’ as a human or 
animal experience. In all this mist the prime factor is provided by the illusion 
that it is possible for men to hold communication with God or, at least, to 
enter into a covenant relationship with Him without miracle—vertical from 
above, without the dissolution of all things, and apart from THE truth which 
lies beyond birth and death.
10
 
The message of Barth’s Romans is that God’s wrath is directed against all those who 
seek to deny or overcome the ‘infinite qualitative distinction’—Barth’s citation of 
Kierkegaard—between God and humanity. God is the ‘Wholly Other’ and all we can 
know of God comes from our wandering over the cratered battlefield where God has 
passed by. With this grenade, Barth sought to bring down the edifice of 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 century German theology that followed Schleiermacher in charting a way to God 
starting with religious experience. Barth witnessed to how this focus on the human 
leads to all manner of murky relationships between religion and nationhood, culture, 
race, and language. The experience he recounts as most formative was seeing 
virtually all his former theological teachers sign up to a public letter in support of 
Kaiser Wilhelm’s war policy in 1914.
11
 To claim in this context that religion can be 
more than a witness to the void between the ‘Wholly Other’ and humankind ‘is a 
shameless and abortive anticipation of that which can proceed from the unknown God 
alone. In all this busy concern with concrete things there is always a revolt against 
God. For in it we assist at the birth of the “No-God”, at the making of idols.’
12
 
                                                
10
 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), 49–50. 
11
 Karl Barth, ‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher’, in The 
Theology of Schleiermacher, ed. Dietrich Ritschl (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1982), 
264–65. 
12
 Barth, Romans, 50.  
 6
By 1937 and the second volume of the Church Dogmatics Barth had ceased 
speaking of God as ‘Wholly Other’ and had confidence that the infinite qualitative 
distinction could be transgressed. But—as we have seen—he is adamant that this 
crossing can only be in one direction and at God’s initiative. The route taken by the 
kind of natural theology Brunner espouses, then, is completely cut off: there can be no 
sense of idolatrous heathen religion as a staging post towards authentic worship of the 
true God. For Barth, Israel’s handing over of its Messiah to the Gentiles, long after all 
idols had been set aside, is the starkest demonstration that there is no progress in  
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religion. ‘In the face of the cross of Christ it is monstrous to describe the uniqueness 
of God as an object of ‘natural knowledge.’
13
  Idolatry must be analyzed, then, not as 
an inadequate attempt to reach God who remains unknown, but as the rejection of 
God who is known. 
There is an exegetical hurdle in making good the claim that God cannot be 
known in part through creation apart from revelation. From the Romans 1 passage, 
verse 20 suggests that all persons are without excuse because God’s invisible qualities 
are clearly visible in the world. Barth recognizes that this verse has been used as an 
opening to ‘every kind of natural theology’ but claims that this is to take the verse out 
of its context. The passage 1:18–3:20 stresses that Jews and Gentiles alike stand under 
the judgement and grace of God. But this is so only because of the revelation of God 
in Christ, a revelation that is presupposed by Paul throughout the passage. This is not 
therefore an abstract statement about the heathen; ‘Paul does not know either Jews or 
                                                
13
 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. T. H. 
L. Parker et al., vol. II/1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), 453. 
 7
Gentiles in themselves and as such, but only as they are placed by the cross of Christ 
under the promise, but also under the commandment of God’.
14
 It is through Christ, 
not through the world in itself, that God’s eternal power and nature are revealed. 
Similar issues arise in Acts 14:15-17, where Paul tells the crowd in Lystra that God 
did not leave the nations without testimony to himself, and Acts 17:16-31, Paul’s 
proclamation to the Athenians that he will make known the unknown god they have 
been worshipping through idols. Again, Barth argues that Paul is not referring to some 
independent knowledge of God derived from creation, but the situation all persons are 
placed in by the revelation of God in Christ. 
 The link between natural theology and idolatry is most clear in relation to 
the question of how directly God may be known by humankind. In Romans, Barth 
cites Kierkegaard in explication of 1:4a, ‘and declared to be the Son of God with 
power, according to the Holy Spirit’: ‘Now, Spirit is the direct denial of immediacy. If 
Christ be very God, He must be unknown, for to be known directly is the 
characteristic mark of an idol.’
15
 When, therefore, we make the mistake of supposing 
direct communication with God is possible 
there emerge all those intermediary, collateral, lawless divinities and powers 
and authorities and principalities (viii. 38) that obscure and discolour the light 
of the true God. In the realm of romantic direct communion—in India, for 
example—these divinities are thrown up in the most extravagant numbers. 
Wherever the qualitative distinction between men and the final Omega is 
overlooked or misunderstood, that  
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14
 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. G. T. 
Thomson and Harold Knight, vol. I/2 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956). 306. 
15
 Barth, Romans, 38–9. 
 8
fetishism is bound to appear in which God is experience in ‘birds and 
fourfooted things’ and finally, or rather primarily, in the ‘likeness of 
corruptible man—Personality, the Child, the Woman—and in the half-
spiritual, half-material creations, exhibitions, and representations of His 
creative ability—Family, Nation, State, Church, Fatherland. And so the ‘No-
God’ is set up, idols are erected, and God, who dwells beyond all this and that, 
is ‘given up’.
16
 
In the Church Dogmatics II/1, Barth returns to this theme. The encounter of human 
beings with God is always mediated by a part of created reality, which does not 
become God, but represents God ‘in so far as it is determined, made and used by God 
as His clothing, temple, or sign’
17
. The recognition that no knowledge of God is 
immediate, Barth terms the conditio sine qua non for faith: 
At bottom, knowledge of God in faith is always this indirect knowledge of 
God, knowledge of God in His works, and in these particular works—in the 
determining and using of certain creaturely realities to bear witness to the 
divine reality. What distinguishes faith from unbelief, erroneous faith and 
superstition is that it is content with this indirect knowledge of God.
18
 
Faith stands or falls with this appreciation of the ‘clothed objectivity of God’,
19
 which 
Barth acknowledges as an insight of Luther’s.
20
 
The exegetical hurdle here seems higher than the previous one. Barth claims 
it is a mistake to interpret the recurrent formula ‘And God said’ as proof that the Bible 
allows revelation of God without the veil of God’s works. Barth discusses Exodus 
33:11–23 in this context, where we are told that God spoke to Moses face to face, as a 
man to his friend. This cannot mean direct encounter, Barth argues, because the 
passage goes on to affirm that no one can see God and live. Even in this most rare of 
encounters, Moses is permitted only the sight of God from the back. Similarly, when 
                                                
16
 Barth, Romans, 50. 
17
 Barth, Church Dogmatics II/1, 17. 
18
 Barth, Church Dogmatics II/1,17. 
19
 Barth, Church Dogmatics II/1, 18. 
20
 For an intriguing comparison of Barth’s critique of natural theology with that of 
Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard, see George Connell, ‘Against Idolatry: 
Heidegger and Natural Theology’ in Postmodern Philosophy and Christian Thought, 
ed. Merold Westphal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 144–68. 
 9
the prophets report God’s speech, Barth argues, they are testifying to what they have 
seen of God’s activity in the world. God really stands before them, really speaks to 
them and they really hear God, ‘But all this takes place, not in a direct, but in an 
indirect encounter. What directly confront them are the  
 
[top of page 219] 
 
historical events, forms and relationships which are His work.’
21
 Even the New 
Testament witnesses to God incarnate in Jesus Christ do not encounter God directly: 
they see ‘the sign of all signs’ through God’s humanity, ‘They, too, stand before a 
veil, a sign, a work of God.’
22
 
While Barth closes off the possibility of knowledge of God through creation, 
apart from revelation, therefore, he does not do so in the name of some more direct 
communication from God to humankind. Natural theology is not idolatrous because it 
looks for God in an indirect way in creation when it ought to be attending to the direct 
source of revelation: it is idolatrous because it claims that creation gives direct and 
immediate knowledge of God. Faith is content with an indirect knowledge of God, 
and therefore looks for and finds God’s revelation in the work of God in the world. 
Natural theology looks to the world with the idolatrous aim of seeing God directly 
apart from God’s revelation; faith looks to the world with the aim of receiving God’s 
word as it is mediated through created reality. 
                                                
21
 Barth, Church Dogmatics II/1, 19. 
22
 Barth, Church Dogmatics II/1, 20. For a reflection on the veiledness of Christ in 
Barth’s theology, see Trevor Hart, ‘The Word, the Words and the Witness: 
Proclamation as Divine and Human Reality’ in Regarding Karl Barth: Essays toward 
a Reading of His Theology (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1999), 28–47. 
 10
There can be no progressive development of religion, therefore, as Feuerbach 
and Brunner envisage. This does not mean, however, that Barth considers that the 
Christian religion should be placed in a category separate and distinct from all others. 
Here he cites Strauss on the foolishness of Christian theologians who fail to 
acknowledge the historical background to the development of their religion: ‘Because 
the fruit is now before us, separated as ripe fruits usually are, from the twig and stalk 
which bore them, it is supposed not to have grown on a tree, but to have fallen direct 
from heaven. What a childish idea!’
23
  Barth avoids Strauss’s criticism in recognizing 
that ‘“Christianity” or the “Christian Religion” is one predicate for a subject which 
may have other predicates. It is a species within a genus in which there may be other 
species.’
24
 The Christian religion, then, is one among the many religions contradicted 
by the revelation of God. From the standpoint of revelation it too can be clearly seen 
‘to be a human attempt to anticipate what God in His revelation wills to do and does 
do. It is the attempted replacement of the divine work by a human manufacture’.
25
 
Apart from revelation, Christians have the duty to apply God’s judgement on religion 
firstly and most acutely to themselves.
26
 I have already referred to Barth’s view of the 
disastrous turn of German Protestant theology in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. 
When he turns to Roman Catholic  
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theology his critique is no less severe, claiming that the problem is not just in relation 
to natural theology, but errors in the doctrine of God: 
                                                
23
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 283. 
24
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 281. 
25
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 302. 
26
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 326. 
 11
We reject this because it is a construct which obviously derives from an 
attempt to unite Yahweh with Baal, the triune God of the Holy Scripture with 
the concept of being of Aristotelian and Stoic philosophy. The assertion that 
reason can know God from created things applies to the second and heathenish 
component of this concept of God, so that when we view the construct on this 
side we do not recognise God in it at all, nor can we accept it as a Christian 
concept of God.
27
 
Barth therefore follows Luther and Calvin in applying the condemnation of idolatry to 
the Christian religion. ‘What we have here is in its own way—a different way from 
that of other religions, but no less seriously—unbelief, i. e., opposition to the divine 
revelation, and therefore active idolatry and self-righteousness.’
28
 He recognizes, 
however, that the problem of religion cannot be avoided. We act as receivers of 
images of God, and as creators of counter images.
29
  This activity is inevitable and 
necessary, and there is no special virtue in iconoclasm:  
Of course it is inevitable and not without meaning that in times of strong 
Christian feeling heathen temples should be levelled to the earth, idols and 
pictures of saints destroyed, stained glass smashed, organs removed: to the 
great distress of aesthetes everywhere. But irony usually had it that Christian 
churches were built on the very sites of these temples and with materials taken 
from their pillars and furnishings … This goes to show that while the 
devaluation and negation of what is human may occasionally have a practical 
and symbolical significance in detail, it can never have any basic or general 
significance.
30
 
Christians are, then, inevitably engaged in the human religious activity of 
religion, with its very real dangers of idolatry. How can they be sure their religion is 
true? This question seems crucial given Barth’s blistering critique of all forms of 
religion alongside his recognition that religion is human activity in response to God’s 
revelation. How is the religion Barth endorses to escape the charge of idolatry that all 
others face? Barth recognizes the force of this question, and frequently comments on 
how dependence on  
                                                
27
 Barth, Church Dogmatics II/1, 84 
28
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 327. 
29
 Barth, Church Dogmatics II/1, 182. 
30
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 300. 
 12
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revelation can become idolatrous: when the Trinitarian revelation of God deals with 
the appearance of God rather than God’s true being;
31
 when revelation is presented as 
objective with no account is given of how revelation is received by human beings;
32
 
when religion exists in a safe sphere apart from the plight of the neighbour;
33
 when 
the church assembles around revelation as a lifeless idol and despairs of itself;
34
 when 
the authority of Scripture in relation to the church is presented as the lifeless calm of 
icy mountain peaks;
35
 or when the church hears God’s word without acting on it, 
making the Word of God into a lifeless idol.
36
 Alongside these alerts to how 
revelation can go wrong, Barth offers a series of criteria for how the church can avoid 
idolatry: that it is the name of Christ that functions as the final test,
37
 that the key 
question is whether the adherents and representatives are really God’s church,
38
 and 
that the issue is whether Christians have found grace before God.
39
 
Barth does not, therefore, mean to deny that religion can be true: indeed, he 
asserts that ‘Christianity is the true religion’. But for a religion to become true is 
possible only on the same basis that sinners can be justified: it is a possibility that is 
dependent on the grace and revelation of God.
40
 Therefore these alerts and tests, either 
                                                
31
 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. G. 
W. Bromiley, vol. I/1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), 353. 
32
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 237. 
33
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 434. 
34
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 545. 
35
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 673. 
36
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 846. 
37
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 343. 
38
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 356. 
39
 Barth, Church Dogmatics II/1, 357. 
40
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 325–6. 
 13
individually or collectively, will not be able to function as an objectively clear 
measure by which Christians could establish their righteousness or unrighteousness. 
To provide such a measure would have been a contradiction of Barth’s position, since 
the very search for such an unassailable judgement shows the character of our religion 
to be self-righteousness and idolatry. There is no refuge from the question of whether 
our worship is true, or whether it is subject to the prophetic judgement Isaiah or Amos 
pronounced on their contemporaries. Barth’s alerts and tests aim to keep us aware of 
the constant pitfalls into which we may fall in our religious life, not to provide 
support for our endemic preoccupation with self-justification. 
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2. The idolatry of nations 
Idolatry is therefore a religious problem: it is a turning from the God who reveals 
Godself in Jesus Christ, the attempt to grasp at revelation, to anticipate it, to talk 
about God instead of listening to God.
41
 Yet Barth was always alert to how the 
consequences of idolatry went far beyond the religious sphere. In 1922, in his Romans 
commentary, Barth showed how the dead idols human beings fashion attain an ironic 
life of their own in their power over us:  
The images and likenesses, whose meaning we have failed to perceive, 
become themselves purpose and content and end. And now men have really 
become slaves and puppets of things, of ‘Nature’ and of ‘Civilization’, whose 
dissolution and establishing by God they have overlooked.
42
 
                                                
41
 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 302-3. 
42
 Barth, Romans, 51. 
 14
If this was clear in 1922, it became clearer in the years that followed. Timothy 
Gorringe, in his valuable study placing Barth’s theology in its social context, traces 
the idolatrous tendencies of German National Socialism. In 1928 Goebbels said of 
Hitler that ‘many are called but few are chosen’: he was the only man capable by 
‘fate-given perception and the power of the word’ to be a ‘pathbreaker of the future’ 
through ‘the active grace of destiny’. In 1933, Heidegger in his inaugural lecture 
‘hailed Hitler as a leader called by destiny, sanctioned by all the primal forces of the 
German soul that made the Leader and the led one flesh’. Hitler claimed that 
providence had spoken to him and brought him success. Even more chilling is Alfred 
Rosenberg’s 1930 account of Nazi religion, in which he called for ‘a new faith, the 
myth of blood’ in which Aryan blood would be the new sacrament of the German 
people. Alongside the extremism of this blasphemy Gorringe notes the increased 
stridency of the political theology of Hirsch and others, weaving the Volk, state, war 
and God ever more closely together. Hirsch claimed in 1933 that ‘Not one people in 
the world has a statesman who takes Christianity so seriously. When Adolf Hitler 
ended his great speech on 1 May with a prayer, the whole world felt the wonderful 
sincerity of it’.
43
 
To respond to these developments, Barth considered it crucial to understand 
them for what they were: not mere rhetoric, not mere politics, not some inexplicable 
aberration, but the consequences of an idolatrous reversal of revelation and religion. 
The ‘German Christians’ were the Protestants who accommodated themselves to 
National Socialism after Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933, and were prepared to 
swear allegiance to Hitler and place Mein Kampf on the altar beside the Bible. Barth 
saw this development as ‘the last, fullest and worst monstrosity of neo- 
                                                
43
 Timothy Gorringe, Karl Barth: Against Hegemony (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1999), 129–30. 
 15
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Protestantism’, but believed that simply to address this consequence in isolation 
would be to no avail. The first requirement must be to do theology rightly:  
we cannot be afraid of the consequences and repudiate them unless it is 
perfectly clear that we are not co-operating in that reversal of revelation and 
religion. To put it concretely, we are defenceless against the “German 
Christians” of our own time, unless we know how to guard against the 
development which took place in van Til and Buddeus, and even earlier.
44
  
For this reason, the 1934 Barmen Declaration of the Confessing Church, which Barth 
drafted, was not primarily a denouncing of opponents, but a creedal affirmation of 
authentic faith. Its first article puts Barth’s insistence on the priority of revelation, and 
his rejection of alternative sources of knowledge of God, in context: 
“I am the Way and the Truth and the Life; no one comes to the Father except 
through me” …  
Jesus Christ, as he is attested to us in Holy Scripture, is the one Word of God 
whom we have to hear, and whom we have to trust and obey in life and in 
death. 
We reject the false doctrine that the church could and should recognize as the 
source of its proclamation, beyond and besides this one Word of God, yet 
other events, powers, historic figures, and truths as God’s revelation.
45
 
The intimate connection Barth saw between theology and politics is further made 
clear in his discussion of the divine perfections, Church DogmaticsII/1, composed in 
1938-9. Under the heading ‘The Unity and Omnipresence of God’, Barth observes: 
every genuine proclamation of the Christian faith is a force disturbing to, even 
destructive of, the advance of religion, its life and richness and peace … No 
sentence is more dangerous or revolutionary than that God is One and there is 
no other like Him … It was on the truth of the sentence that God is One that 
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the “Third Reich” of Adolf Hitler made shipwreck. Let this sentence be 
uttered in such a way that it is heard and grasped, and at one 450 prophets of 
Baal are always in fear of their  
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lives. Beside God there are only His creatures or false gods, and beside faith in 
Him there are religions only as religions of superstition, error and finally 
irreligion.’
46
 
Gorringe comments that this text shows Barth’s profound conviction ‘that God 
constitutes our reality, and cannot therefore be ultimately contradicted’.
47
 
It would be absurd, I believe, and the greatest contrast with the politically 
engaged theology of Barth, for theologians to meditate soberly on the relationship 
between theology and politics in 1930s Germany, without also pausing to reflect on 
the possibility of an idolatrous politics in our day. For today, as then, world events are 
dominated by those who take religion seriously, by the Al Quaida terrorists engaged 
in a campaign of mass murder in the name of Islam, and by the heads of state of the 
US and the UK, who led the campaign against them in Afghanistan, and who used it 
as a springboard to beginning a new conflict with the old adversary of Iraq. There is 
obviously no moral equivalence between current US and UK foreign policy and the 
policies of the Nazi Germany, but this does not mean that there is no comparison to be 
made between the use of religious language in the two cases. Should we not marvel at 
the way Christian language is invoked in US presidential addresses, just as we have in 
the speeches of German politicians before World War II? In the State of the Union 
address preceding the Iraq war that began in 2003, George Bush stated that the United 
States of America has ‘been called to a unique role in human events’. Faced by 
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enemies who ‘embrace tyranny and death as a creed’, America stands for a different 
choice, ‘freedom and the dignity of every life’. It will ‘overcome evil with greater 
good’, ‘lead the world towards the values that will bring lasting peace’, and it has 
discovered again that ‘God is near’.
48
 In more muted tones these themes were echoed 
by the British Prime Minister, who also believes in a battle of good versus evil 
embodied in the conflicts between nation states.
49
 If we are to learn from Barth’s 
vision of the relationship between theology and politics, we should not rush to 
repudiate particulars sentiments, or offer our political judgement on particular 
policies, or particular UN resolutions. Our first tasks as theologians are to reflect on 
the theological meaning of the words used in such debates, to ask about the nature of 
the theology that gives rise to them, and to question whether the churches to which we 
belong are engaged in a faithful, or idolatrous witness. 
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3. Idolatry and atheism 
I began with the critiques of religion offered by Marx and Feuerbach, and we now 
have an overview of Barth’s critique, which has much in common with them. Barth 
acknowledges this common ground. In the 1922 Romans commentary, he portrays the 
‘No-God’ worshipped by those too cowardly to be atheists: 
What men on this side of resurrection name ‘God’ is most characteristically 
not God. Their ‘God’ does not redeem his creation, but allows free course to 
the unrighteousness of men; does not declare himself to be God, but is the 
complete affirmation of the course of the world and of men as it is. This is 
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intolerable, for, in spite of the highest honours we offer him for his 
adornment, he is, in fact, ‘No-God.’ The cry of revolt against such a god is 
nearer the truth than is the sophistry with which men attempt to justify him. 
Only because they have nothing better, only because they lack the courage of 
despair, do the generality of men on this side of resurrection avoid falling 
into blatant atheism.
50
 
Barth frequently engages with Feuerbach in the Church Dogmatics, often to challenge 
complacent theology. He is perplexed, for example, how the defenders of the modern 
doctrine of God, ‘that the being of God is the predicate of the human subject’ could 
‘expose themselves so openly to this objection of Feuerbach’.
51
 In an ironic reference 
to Nietzsche, Barth argues that the New Testament account of knowledge of the triune 
God as contrasted with the world of religions in the first centuries ‘signified and 
signifies the most radical “twilight of the gods”’, in Schiller’s words the ‘de-
divinisation of the lovely world’. The charge of atheism against the Early Church was 
not fabrication, Barth argues, ‘and it would have been wiser for its apologists not to 
have defended themselves so keenly against this charge’.
52
 
Christian faith shares this critical view of religion with atheism, therefore, 
and journeys along the same road. Where it parts company, for Barth, is where the 
critique broadens to encompass atheism. For atheism and religion have much in 
common: 
In their general view of the world scientists and historians are in far closer 
agreement with philosophers and theologians than is normally recognized. It 
is not merely that the world exists side by side with God: it has taken His 
place, and has itself become God, and demands ‘the  
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same devotion which the old-fashioned believer offered to His God’ (D. F. 
Strauss). Contradictions within the deified world—Nature and Civilization, 
Materialism and Idealism, Capitalism and Socialism, Secularism and 
Ecclesiasticism, Imperialism and Democracy—are not so serious as they 
give themselves out to be. Such contradictions are contradictions within the 
world, and there is for them no paradox, no negation, no eternity.
53
 
Where mysticism internalizes and spiritualizes religion, concealing the ‘No’ it must 
finally speak to religion, atheism childishly shouts it out to the world. Its whole 
interest is in the denial of religion as such: it lives in and by its negation. But its 
negation does not go far enough: it ‘does not deny the reality of nature, history, and 
civilization, of man’s animal and rational existence, of this or that ethic or the lack of 
it. On the contrary, these are the authorities and powers to which the atheist usually 
subscribes with the happiest and most naive credulity’. Its denials give rise to idolatry 
and self-righteousness, opening the door again to every kind of religious glorification. 
This means ‘It is really opposed to religion only as the spring is to the river, as the 
root to the tree, as the unborn child to the adult’.
54
 If the human power to devise and 
form gods is to be challenged, something more radical is required: 
A real crisis of religion is needed to affect this power … It will not have to 
be content with easy successes against the theologies and ideologies and 
mythologies of external religion, extending only to temple buildings and 
ceremonies and observances. It will have to rush into that inner chamber 
shouting: ‘Here is the fabrica idolorum! Here we lie and murder and steal 
and commit adultery! Here the cry must be: Ecrasez l’infame! … The real 
crisis of religion can only break in from outside the magic circle of religion 
and its place of origin, i. e. from outside man … This is what happens in the 
revelation of God.
55
 
 
Barth’s account of idolatry is significant in identifying three unlikely and 
unsuspecting groups of idolators. The primary target of his critique is the church. The 
problem of religion, which is the problem of idolatry, is the problem of theology, 
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according to Barth,
56
 and he is merciless in identifying the idolatrous possibilities of 
all religion—including Christianity. Christians must recognize that idolatry is firstly a 
problem for the church, not for others: it is the test of whether its religion is dependent 
on the revelation  
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and grace of God, or has become merely a self-serving human activity. Having 
appreciated the peril of their position, Christians should be alert to the dangers of 
lapsing into the belief that their religious practices have merit of themselves, apart 
from the grace of God. They will continue these practices—there is no alternative to 
religion—but will do so in recognition that the truth and worth of their religion lies in 
God’s hands, not in their own. 
The second target of Barth’s critique may find itself even more surprised 
than the church to be accused of idolatry. Politicians attempting to draw on religious 
justifications for their policies may be guilty of idolatry, or blasphemy, or both. Barth 
witnessed the prostitution of German Christianity to the idols of Nazism in his day, 
and his alertness to the dangers of allegiances between politics and religion, I have 
suggested, remains crucial in the politics of the twenty-first century. 
The third group to face the charge of idolatry are those who thought they had 
left all such religious practice behind. Atheists are in danger of substituting idols such 
as nature, civilization, human reason, relativism or freedom for the God they deny. 
Ceasing to worship God is not an escape from idolatry: it can frequently result in the 
erection of idols to fill the space formerly occupied. Theology has the potential to 
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offer a more radical critique than atheism, affirming with Marx that humankind makes 
religion, but continuing to recognize that atheism too is of human manufacture. The 
critique of idolatry, therefore, should also give pause to those who have forsaken 
religion. Barth concurs with Marx that the critique of religion is the beginning of all 
criticism; he differs from Marx concerning where this criticism, the unmasking of 
idolatry in all its forms, should end. 
